Fluoride. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. In the summer of 1964, President Lyndon Baines Johnson needed a pretext to commit the American people to the already expanding covert war in South East Asia. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. The Americans claimed they sank two torpedo boats and damaged a third, while the torpedo boats claimed to have shot down two American aircraft. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. 12. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . We have no intention of yielding to pressure. "4 Send the First Troops to Vietnam? Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. He spoke out against banning girls education. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a brief confrontation between United States and North Vietnamese warships, off the coast of northern Vietnam in August 1964. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Gulf of Tonkin incident, complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. The Health Conspiracy. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. 2. 11. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. The U.S. Navy stressed that the two technically were not in communication with one another, but the distinction was irrelevant to the North Vietnamese. American SIGINT analysts assessed the North Vietnamese reporting as probable preparations for further military operations against the Desoto patrol. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. . These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." 5. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. 13. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Did Johnson learn something from the first experience? The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. Gulf of Tonkin - A secret report reveals how easily soldiers, spies and politicians can jump to a conclusion and plunge the country into war. Soon came a second more sinister interpretation -- that the incident was a conspiracy not only provoked by the Johnson administration but one in fact "scenarioed." Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. We still seek no wider war.. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Oklahoma City Bombing. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). . 15. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. This article by Capt. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. no isolated event. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. 302-303. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. IV-2 to IV-4. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CONFLICT Volume II: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 By Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald Government Printing Office for The Naval Historical Center 591 pp. 9. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Simultaneously, U.S. SIGINT was placed on increased alert to monitor indications of future North Vietnamese threats to the Desoto Missions, and additional air and naval forces were deployed to the Western Pacific. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. The stage was set. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. The Maddox planned to sail to 16 points along the North Vietnam coast, ranging from the DMZ north to the Chinese border. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Whether they produced battlefield images of the dead or daguerreotype portraits of common soldiers, []. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. That very night, the idea was put to the test. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Early Military Career The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two.